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Abstract—Fine-grained hardware protection could provide a 
powerful and effective means for isolating untrusted code.  
However, previous techniques for providing fine-grained 
protection in hardware have lead to poor performance.  Legba 
has been proposed as a new caching architecture, designed to 
reduce the granularity of protection, without slowing down the 
processor.  Unfortunately, the designers of Legba have not 
attempted an implementation.  Instead, all of their analysis is 
based purely on simulations.  We present an implementation of 
the Legba design on a MIPS Core Processor, along with an 
analysis of our observations and results. 
Keywords: Legba, protection, PLB 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Protection is a long-standing problem in operating systems 
safety.  With the growing popularity of mobile code, the 
proliferation of third-party operating systems extensions, and 
the clear dangers of running these extensions in a privileged 
context, there is a definite need for better protection 
mechanisms. 
Recent work on Microsoft’s Singularity[8] project rely on 
software isolated processes to provide safety properties.  Type-
safe languages do provide strong software protection 
mechanisms for safety.  However, given the frequency of 
defects in software systems resulting in vulnerabilities, we 
suggest that some additional layers of protection may improve 
the situation. 
Brian Bershad observed that while software protection 
mechanisms provide the most flexible and applicable 
protections, “software mechanisms usually rely on hardware as 
a foundation to ensure their own integrity, while changes in 
hardware protection are usually controlled and limited through 
software mechanisms.” [10] We agree whole-heartedly with 
this observation, and believe that hardware mechanisms should 
be designed and evaluated for providing fine-grained 
encapsulation of light-weight objects. 
Legba[2] is a hardware design for fast, fine-grained 
memory protection.  Unfortunately, the original designers have 
not yet attempted an implementation.  While the design appears 
to provide the protection mechanisms required, the design 
needs validation beyond simulation.   We have attempted to 
implement Legba in VHDL to better understand the design 
space and to validate the Legba achitecture. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of providing fine-grained memory protection 
in an efficient manner is not new.  Most current processors 
provide a partial solution by attaching permissions to pages in 
the Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB). 
This has two disadvantages.  The lines in a TLB refer to 
pages.  Thus, permissions can only be as fine-grained as the 
page size.  For most processors, this is 4KB.  Secondly, the 
TLB is shared among all processes on the system.  We must 
either add context tags to the TLB lines, or perform a complete 
TLB flush on a context switch. 
This solution is also usually limited in the number of 
entries.  Because the TLB is frequently fully associative and 
must be on the processor core (and critical path), the size of the 
TLB is minimized to reduce the access time and avoid 
lengthening the processor critical path. 
Given the inadequacy of current processor architectures for 
providing fine-grained protection, research efforts have been 
made in new architectures for protection. 
A. Software Solutions 
A number of software solutions have been proposed to 
provide the flexible protections required.  While all of these are 
useful in their own space, they still rely on hardware for a 
foundation. 
One method of safely running untrusted code is to use an 
interpreter.  If implemented correctly, this does provide 
complete safety.  However, interpreted code is slow and 
inefficient.  Some studies have found that interpreted code is up 
to 100x slower than native machine code. [13] Finally, while a 
correct interpreter provides complete safety, proving the 
correctness of a large piece of software such as an interpreter is 
usually challenging. 
Proof-Carrying Code [14] is a much more promising line of 
research.  A proof of safety is embedded in a program.  Before 
loading the program, the system checks the proof against the 
code and determines whether it is safe to run.  This provides 
the best of both worlds: the mathematically demonstrated 
safety with the speed of native code.  Unfortunately, creating 
these proofs has proved to be a very difficult problem, and an 
automated safety prover is still out of reach. 
Type-safe languages [15,9,8] provide another approach.  
The language does not provide constructs for violating the 
type-safety of object encapsulations.  Each component is 
software isolated from every other object.  The major problem 
here is in ensuring that each program is from a type-safe 
compiler, and that they each adhere to the software protection 
scheme.   Additionally, there is the non-trivial problem of 
validating the correctness of a large, complex compiler. 
Software Fault Isolation isolates faults in one module from 
impacting another module.  One very effective method is 
NOOKS, outlined in [16].  NOOKS uses a combination of 
automatically instrumented code and memory management 
techniques to prevent a defective kernel module from 
corrupting the rest of the kernel.  However, the memory 
management techniques rely on modifying the TLB to restrict 
access to memory.  While this prevents a defective module 
from inadvertently trampling kernel memory by mistake, no 
attempt is made to prevent the module from loading a new TLB 
and accessing at will.  In the words of the NOOKS designers, 
“We trust kernel extensions not to be malicious, but we do not 
trust them not to be buggy.”  This is a valuable design space, 
but we are interested in assurance from malicious code, not 
merely defective code. 
B. Palladium 
Palladium [17] attempts to solve the same problem using 
existing segmentation and paging hardware in the Intel x86 
class of processors.  Since these processors support a large 
(8,192) number of segments, each with its own privilege level, 
as well as near arbitrary size, this seems like a promising option 
at first.  Unfortunately, at closer examination there are some 
significant disadvantages. 
These segment protection levels are limited to 2 bits, or 
four ordered levels.  This is adequate for a very shallow 
ordered hierarchy.  However, for an arbitrary protection matrix, 
we need to be able to support non-hierarchical orderings of 
arbitrary depth.  In short, a complete subject/object access 
control matrix [18]. 
Palladium also has a significant protection domain 
boundary crossing penalty of 142 cycles.  While this is not an 
insurmountable difficulty, it is possible to reduce the protection 
domain boundary crossing penalty. 
C. Itanium 
Itanium provides a Protection Key Register (PKR) [19].  
This PKR is a 16-entry fully-associative cache.  Since the 
cache lines do not have context tags, the cache must be flushed 
on every access. 
Since the PKR is separated from the TLB, TLB cache lines 
can be shared between different protection domains, with 
different access permissions.  However, since the PKR still ties 
protection to individual pages, we have no sub-page protection.  
Furthermore, the PKR is on the processor critical path.  This is 
probably the driving force behind the choice of PKR size; a 
large, fully associative cache would add significantly to the 
processor critical path length. 
D. Protection Look-aside Buffers 
A major innovation in protection management comes with 
protection look-aside buffers (PLBs) [4].  With PLBs, we 
remove all protection information from the TLB and place it in 
a new construct, the PLB. 
If we use virtually addressed L1 cache, then the TLB is no 
longer necessary for L1 cache operations, and can be moved 
off core.  This allows us to expand the TLB and increase the 
associativity, since it is only used during L2 or lower accesses; 
the latency can be masked in the lower level memory access. 
Another major benefit is that the PLB is much smaller than 
the TLB.  Unfortunately, the PLB still suffers from all of the 
classical drawbacks of a TLB.  It is still fully associative, and 
still sits on the processor critical path. 
Finally, the classical PLB suffers one more major 
disadvantage: the need to perform an associative lookup of an 
address without knowing the base address of the object whose 
attributes are cached.  Thus, when we wish to check the 
permissions associated with an address, we need to use the 
address to look up the associated memory object in a fully-
associative cache using object base and limit.  Having this 
lookup in the L1 cache is expensive. 
E. Mondrian Memory Protection 
Mondrian Memory Protection [7] incorporates the concept 
of the PLB and adds an additional optimization, the sidecar.  
Sidecars are cached protection bits applied to any register 
capable of containing an address (including the program 
counter). 
When first a register is used to address memory, the 
memory permissions are not known.  However, once the 
permissions are known, they are cached in a sidecar to the 
register.  Future accesses check the sidecar first; if the address 
object is still the same, the sidecar permissions are used instead 
of consulting the PLB for permissions.  This removes the PLB 
from the processor critical path. 
In the case of mondrian memory protection, the sidecar 
contains: 
• the base of the last memory access 
• the limit of the last memory access 
• the rights of the last memory access 
As no context tags are included, the sidecars must be 
flushed on each context tag.  PLB entries do include context, 
allowing us to share cache lines between different protection 
domains using different permissions. 
Mondrian memory protection still uses a classical PLB, and 
suffers from the major disadvantage of the PLB: the associative 
lookup. 
III. OVERVIEW OF LEGBA 
Legba provides fine-grained memory protection by 
combining features of many disparate memory protection 
schemes. 
Mondrian memory protection comes closest to meeting our 
needs, except for the associative lookup.  That is, we have an 
address, A, which falls between some object O’s base B and 
limit B+L.  Then we should apply the permissions of object O 
to accesses to address A.  The problem becomes: how do we 
associate address A with object O?  In mondrian, the address is 
checked in L1 cache. 
In the case of Legba, we no longer store address objects in 
the PLB – in L1 cache – by base and limit, but by Object 
Identifiers (OIDs).  This also allows us to add a level of 
indirection from the data cache lookup to the actual protection 
information, permitting us to share cache lines between 
multiple protection domains. 
To add this indirection, Legba supplies a data cache with 
the usual data, tags, and stats fields; as well as an OID used to 
index a second cache, the Protection Key Cache (PKC), with 
protection information.  To avoid extending the processor 
critical path, the PKC is placed in the pipeline stage following 
the data cache. 
To facilitate the sharing of data cache lines between 
different protection domains, the PKC is indexed by both the 
OID from the cache and the current Protection Domain 
Identifier (PDID).  See Figure 1 [2]. 
Legba uses four permission bits: e(X)ecute, (S)witch, 
(R)ead, and (W)rite.  X, R, and W are self-explanatory; S is 
iscussed in more detail under the new instructions for Legba. 
Legba also includes sidecars à la mondrian memory 
protection.  However, in the case of Legba, the sidecars do not 
contain the full base+limit, but just an OID.  During data 
lookup in the cache, an authoritative OID is returned.  Sidecar 
content is validated by comparing OIDs. 
Finally, Legba also adds two new instructions: Branch-
Linked-Locked (BLL) and Switch-Load (SL), for managing the 
current PDID. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
Our implementation is based on the MiniMIPS [11] 
implementation of the MIPS core.  The MiniMIPS is a standard 
5-stage (IF|ID|EX|MA|WB) pipelined architecture with support 
for exceptions, pipeline stalls on branches, and no cache or 
virtual memory (and thus no TLB).  We found that Legba 
adapted very well to implementation on the MiniMIPS. 
In our implementation, an attempt to access memory in 
violation of policy generates an exception.  In the MiniMIPS, 
an exception is handled by an immediate jump to a global 
exception handling address.  Our implementation does not 
actually include the exception handler, which we consider to be 
outside our scope. 
The pipeline stall on branch required one minor change to 
our BLL/SL instruction implementation, detailed below. 
The lack of a TLB means that we cannot mask the latency 
of the associative lookup of the OID by performing this in 
parallel with address translation.  Since most processor 
architectures today do have a TLB, we consider this to be an 
unusual case that does not invalidate the assumption that the 
latency can be hidden with a parallel lookup. 
In general, we believe that the Legba architecture can be 
added to almost any processor architecture without great 
difficulty, although we only offer the anecdotal evidence of our 
own implementation as proof. 
A. Pipeline Changes 
Our implementation made very few changes to the pipeline 
structure. 
We added several new components to the pipeline.  The 
major addition is the Protection Key Cache, or PKC.  See 
Figure 2 [2].  Also, since the MiniMIPS had no cache, we also 
added the instruction cache and data cache to the pipeline, for a 
modified Harvard architecture.  In most architectures, this is 
unnecessary, since a separate instruction and data cache are 
commonly included.  
We also found it necessary to add some additional registers 
to the pipeline.  We added a PDID (Protection Domain ID), to 
represent the current execution context, and a Protection Key 
Figure 1: Cache and PKC relationship 
(Picture copyright A. Wiggins [2]) 
 Figure 2: PKC location within Pipeline 
(Picture copyright A. Wiggins [2]) 
Table Register, which will be discussed under the memory 
hierarchy. 
Finally, it is worth detailing exceptions in the MiniMIPS.  
When an exception is raised, all stages prior to the exception 
are filled with NOPs, and a signal is sent to the PC register.  
The next address to be loaded in the instruction fetch stage will 
be the address of the exception handler.  For our 
implementation, we used address 0xFFFF0000. 
B. Instructions Added 
Legba requires the addition of two new instructions: 
BRANCH-LINKED-LOCKED (BLL) and SWITCH-LOAD (SL).  To 
simplify our implementation, we changed the BLL to a simple 
JUMP instead of a BRANCH-LINKED.  That is, we do not save 
the old address on a stack, etc.  Instead, we treat the BLL much 
more like a syscall or trap instruction.  The exact semantics are 
as follows: 
On reading a Branch-Linked-Locked, the processor sets up 
for a normal JMP, passing the address to the MiniMIPS jump 
logic.  The jump logic handles relative branch computation and 
stalling the pipeline. 
We also add an additional pipelined signal which passes 
through to the Instruction Fetch stage with the jump 
information.  This signal notifies the IF stage that the next 
instruction must be SL. 
On load, we have additional logic we have added to the IF 
stage that checks the signal and the next instruction.  If a BLL 
is not followed by SL, an exception is raised. 
Before executing the SL instruction, we verify that we have 
(S)witch permission to the object in which it resides.  When 
executed, SL takes the OID of the object containing the SL and 
loads it into the pipelined PDID register. 
The actual validation of the X and S permissions are 
addressed in our discussion of the PKC component.  It is 
sufficient to note for now that we must have X permission to 
the object in which both the BLL and SL reside, and S 
permission for the object in which the SL resides. 
One point not discussed in the original design of Legba is 
whether a naked SL should generate a permissions exception.  
We elected to allow this case.  Thus, SL may be encountered in 
any point in the program.  However, given that the only way 
this can happen is if we “fall through” from one object space to 
another, or by jumping to an SL by a normal JMP (where a 
BLL could be used), this seems to be mostly irrelevant. 
In summary: our implementation adds two instructions to 
the MiniMIPS instruction table, the BLL and SL.  We also add 
logic to the IF stage to verify that SL follows BLL (component 
is_SL).  Finally, we add logic to the ID stage to load the new 
PDID into the pipeline (component pdid_update).  Since 
the PDID is only used in the ID and WB stages, we latch it in 
stage ID as a register, and pipeline it through to the WB stage 
as a normal pipelined signal. 
C. Sidecars 
Legba implements Mondrian-style sidecars, but instead of a 
base+limit identifier, we use an OID.  Because of concerns in 
the caching components, we made our OIDs 16 bits. 
Our sidecar adds 19 bits to the storage for each register (see 
Figure 3).  Note that we only have 2 bits of permissions, 
despite having 4 distinct protection bits.  This is because we 
have two distinct types of registers.  The PC is only ever used 
to execute or switch, never to read or write.  The other general 
registers are only ever used to read and write, never to execute 
or switch.  Thus, we can save 2 bits on each sidecar by only 
caching the relevant bits. 
Our implementation has the following semantics: 
1. On context switch (SL instruction), all sidecar “valid” 
bits are cleared. 
2. When a register is used in a lookup, real permissions 
are validated for that lookup in the cache and PKC. 
3. As a side benefit to checking these permissions, we 
also route them back to the register used in the lookup, 
as a sidecar update.  This update may also change the 
OID of the register. 
The implementation requires only a few changes to the 
existing MiniMIPS: add storage bits to the register, and 
“update” and “flush” lines to the register files.  We also add 
pipelined signals to track which register is being used in a 
memory access, so that sidecar updates are routed to the correct 
register.  This adds no logic to the top level, just an additional 
signal for the pipeline. 
The sidecar updates take the exact same form as the sidecar 
data itself, where the “valid” bit is used to assert an update. 
D. Memory Hierarchy 
Our cache architecture is a 4-way modified Harvard 
architecture.  (See figure 4)  While the addition of two more L1 
cache components runs the risk of more frequent stalls, the 
original designers believe that PKC misses should be rare.  We 
discuss this assertion further in our evaluation section. 
An important point not addressed in either the original 
Legba design or in our own implementation is cache 
coherence.  Given that we now have 4 separate cache 
components in L1, we believe it would be most efficient to 
implement request bus snooping to maintain coherence.  
Additionally, bus snooping allows us to monitor changes to 
permissions in the lower level Protection Key Table (PKT), 
updating the relevant PKC and/or cache.  The original Legba 
design also mentions the possibility of object re-numbering; 
this could be an acceptable way to implement this. 
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In our actual implementation, we completely ignore the 
issue of cache coherence and recommend this to future 
investigators. 
1) L1 cache 
Our L1 cache scheme has 4 different components.  
However, the instruction cache and the data cache can be 
implemented by the same component, as can the two Protection 
Key Caches (PKC’s). 
Our actual cache was never intended to be synthesizable, 
and was implemented in behavioral VHDL with some delay 
statements.  The problem of implementing cache has long been 
solved, and we use the behavioral VHDL to model a real cache. 
Our cache model is for n-way set associative cache.  Since 
the MiniMIPS does not have virtual memory, it is physically 
addressed and physically tagged.  We chose to make it 4-way 
set associative, but do not attach significance to this number.  
We also add an OID to each line, but all logic for selecting this 
OID is in the L2 cache, not L1.  Our L1 performs simple 
caching only. 
We do encapsulate our L1 cache inside logic to handle an 
unexpected data dependency, explained in our evaluation 
section.  This logic is not present in the original Legba design. 
Our PKCs are significantly more complicated. 
We encapsulate our actual PKC inside a set of logic to 
handle sidecar optimizations, pipeline stall management, and 
protection checking. 
A PKC check requires the following inputs: 
• OID (from cache), 
• sidecar from register, with OID, permission bits, 
and validity, 
• current PDID (from pipeline), 
• access type request (from the instruction, e.g., 
Read, Write) 
PKC outputs: 
• sidecar updates (routed to the relevant register) 
• exception line (on access violation) 
• stall (on cache miss and lower-level lookup) 
Our PKC also has one other output used in managing the 
data dependency mentioned above, detailed in our evaluation 
section. 
On a PKC lookup, we first check the cache OID against the 
sidecar OID.  If they match, and the sidecar is valid, we can 
skip the PKC lookup and used the sidecar permissions. 
Otherwise, we must look in the PKC.  The PKC is a set-
associative cache, indexed by OID.  We used the PDID as the 
tag in our lookups.  Thus, indexing by OID returns a set of 
cache lines; using the PDID, we can do a parallel check of the 
set of cache lines, searching for the correct one.  Since our lines 
are very small (PDID + permissions = 18 bits; adding 
replacement algorithm stats, a line is probably 20 bits), our 
parallel lookup is very fast, and we can afford to have a fairly 
large PKC. 
In either case (sidecar or PKC lookup), the protection 
information is routed with the requested access information to a 
small protection check component (permchk).  This 
component issues the actual exception to the external pipeline. 
During a PKC miss, we need to look up the information 
from lower levels.  However, the protection information is 
actually stored in a PKT in DRAM.  This information is not 
stored in the same format as in our PKC.  The PKT (described 
under DRAM) is a two-level hash table, so a lookup of 
protection from lower levels involves two distinct reads. 
We implemented this as a 3-state FSM within the PKC.  
Normally, the FSM is in the idle state.  On a miss, we begin 
reading from the first hash table (READ1).  After receiving the 
first read, we can read from the second level (READ2).  The 
actual read is from L2, so we may have varying stalls, based on 
the availability of L2 and the hit rate within L2 for the PKT. 
Since the PKT lines (described under DRAM) are not in the 
same format as in L1 and L2 cache, a read from line will return 
protection information for potentially multiple protection 
domains.  In our implementation, we discarded this 
information.  An alternative implementation would be to store 
this information in adjacent lines within the PKC object set.  
We do not consider this particularly valuable.  The line will 
still be cached in L2, so subsequent reads will not need to look 
to DRAM, and since OIDs may share sets if the PKC is small, 
we do not wish to evict one object’s protection in favor of 
another. 
In summary: our L1 cache is fairly standard.  Our PKC is 
the most custom component in our implementation, and does 2 
lookups on a cache miss, due to the 2-level PKT. 
2) L2 cache 
Since we now have a 4-way shared L2 cache, we use a 
simple L2 controller to arbitrate access.  Our arbiter 
(L2_controller) always gives automatic priority to the 
Figure 4: Legba Memory Hierarchy in the MiniMIPS 
architecture 
 request from farthest along the pipeline.  Since prior stages 
cannot advance even if they have the information from L2, this 
simplifies pipeline management. 
We used this memory architecture as a shortcut.  We 
believe that a better implementation would involve a bus, and 
bus snooping by each caching component to detect updates to 
locally cached information.  However, particularly in the case 
of the PKC, it is difficult to see how the PKC can recognize 
that a change to the PKT has been made.  While indexing from 
the PKTR can be detected, the PKT is a 2-level hash table, and 
detecting a modification to the second level is difficult.  
As is typical, we have an address signal, a data bus for data 
transfer in or out, a set of input enable signals (chip, read, and 
write enable), and an output  enable signal (data ready).  Our 
L2 cache lines are shown in Figure 5. 
Our L2 cache contains two components not usually found at 
L2: the TLB and a new component, the Object Look-aside 
Buffer (OLB). 
Since the MiniMIPS has no virtual memory, we do not 
actually implement a real TLB.  We did mark the point where it 
would exist in the L2 cache, and place a dummy “pass-
through” component. 
Choosing to locate the TLB in L2 cache is possible because 
we envision Legba being implemented in an architecture with a 
virtually addressed L1 cache.  Since protection has been moved 
out of the TLB and into the PKC, there is no longer any need to 
keep the TLB on-core, in the L1 region. 
We do implement the OLB.  The OLB is a fully associative 
array of the available objects with base and limit.  A lookup in 
the OLB takes an address and searches all object in parallel to 
return the OID in which the address resides.  Since all cache 
lines within the L2 cache already contain an OID, only lookups 
to DRAM require searching the OLB.  Thus, we mask the OLB 
latency behind the DRAM access latency. 
The remainder of L2 cache is fairly normal, non-associative 
cache.  Once again, we have implemented this as behavioral 
VHDL using delay statements for simulation.  No attempt is 
made to make the L2 cache data portion synthesizable. 
The sequence of operations in the L2 cache is as follows.  
Arbitration is left out of this sequence, as it should be clear 
without discussion. 
1. A request comes in to read/write to some address, 
along with assertions on c_en and rd_en or 
wr_en. 
a. If the data is present, it can be 
read/written immediately.  d_rdy is 
asserted. 
2. On a miss, we perform two tasks in parallel. 
a. Index the address into the OLB, 
obtaining an OID for the data.  (On an 
OLB miss, we generate an exception.) 
b. Issue the read to DRAM, waiting until 
DRAM is ready.  Note: we assume write-
back cache, so the data is read into L2 
cache even on a write. 
3. The data is copied into L2 cache.  The stats are set, 
and the OID is appended to the data line. 
4. Finally, any pending read/write is done, and 
d_rdy is asserted.  
Note that since both L1 and L2 cache have the same cache 
line format, the data and OID are returned on one big bus 
which is redirected directly into the relevant cache line. 
3) DRAM 
Our DRAM is implemented in totally non-synthesizable 
behavioral VHDL with explicit delay statements.  Our DRAM 
consists of a large array of words.  We make no effort to do a 
realistic “progressive delay” in our DRAM, but just apply a 
constant penalty. 
The DRAM interface is very similar to the L2 interface.  
We have an address, a data bus, the usual trio of input enable 
signals, and an output enable signal. 
Stored in DRAM is our actual authoritative protection 
information, the PKT.  Because the protection information is 
stored in memory, updates to the PKT can be made by the OS 
by simply updating the table in memory. 
The PKT is a two-level hash table where the first table is 
addressed by (hashed) OID, and the second level by (hashed) 














The base address of the PKT is stored in a new register, the 
PKTR.  This register is used by the PKC to perform any 
lookups of permissions, but no other caching constructs need to 
be aware of the PKTR. 
Data OID 
Figure 5: L2 cache line 
Figure 6: Legba two-level hash table 
The PKT top level is in cache-line sized rows.  Since we 
assume that our OIDs will be sequentially allocated by the 
operating system, we use a simple 16-bit to 8-bit XOR fold for 
a hash.  This should serve to reduce collisions, particularly if 
OIDs are allocated in a packed manner; that is, lowest available 
first. 
Each row in the top-level of the PKT has a number of 
“tries” for hash function collisions.  In this initial prototype 
implementation, we take no steps to avoid hash table collisions 
beyond our trie limit. 
Within each top-level PKT entry, there is a set of OIDs and 
memory addresses.  Each address points to the Protection 
Domain Hash Table (PDHT) for that OID. 
Within the PDHT, there are a set of PDIDs (one for each 
trie), and a set of 4-bit permissions associated with each one. 
The lookup process is actually driven by the PKC on a PKC 
miss.  The lookup process is: 
1. Read the cache-line sized row at 
PKTR+(OIDhigh+OIDlow). 
2. Perform a parallel check of each entry for the 
correct OID.  In cases of multiple matches, use the 
first.  (Since we use 0 for the OID of empty 
entries, this is possible.) 
3. From the associated address A, read the cache-line 
sized row at A+(PDIDhigh+PDIDlow). 
4. Perform a parallel check of each entry for the 
correct PDID.  Use the associated bits. 
One useful trait is that we can make each of the second-
level PDHTs a separate object, and give read/write permission 
over that object to the owner of that object. 
E. Changes for Virtual Memory 
MiniMIPS does not have virtual memory, and no TLB.  
Because of this, much of the complexity and design points of 
Legba are unused.  However, most modern processors do have 
some form of virtual memory. 
Legba is best suited to virtually addressed L1 cache.  This 
allows us to remove the TLB from the processor critical path, 
and to perform OLB lookups in parallel with TLB lookups.  
Other architectures, while workable, have less ideal choices. 
For example, for a physically addressed L1 cache, we need 
to perform a translation step before a lookup.  In this case, we 
would want our OLB to be at the top level, in the L1 cache.  
Since our OLB is fully associative and sized to hold all 
possible 16-bit values, this is a massive addition to the on-core 
processing. 
To implement Legba on a system with virtual memory, 
certain changes need to be made. 
First, the TLB should be real, located in the L2 cache as we 
have it placed.  Second, all memory lookups need to be tagged 
with an Address Space Identifier (ASID).  This is how most 
modern virtual memory capable processors differentiate 
different address space data in virtually addressed cache. [1] 
Thus, we add the ASIDs to the cache. 
This introduces the “synonym” problem.  We now have 
differently addressed lines in a single cache that both refer to 
the same location in memory.  Efficient ways of dealing with 
the synonym problem is an open area of research; most 
architectures avoid this problem by requiring each address 
space to be wholly distinct, and any shared memory is bundled 
into a special “global” ASID. 
However, one of the major advantages of Legba is that we 
can share cache lines between different protection domains – 
and different address spaces.  Using this scheme now requires a 
different data line for each address-space view of the same 
data.  In this case, Legba is best applied to intra-address space 
access control, not inter-address space access control. 
V. EVALUATION 
During our implementation, we encountered several 
difficulties that were not addressed by the original designers.  
We also clarified some areas of concern, and can place 
reasonable constraints on several architectural properties. 
A. Timing Concerns 
1) Critical Path 
Our implementation makes it clear that Legba does not 
significantly extend the critical path. 
First, in most processors, the critical path is established by 
the EX stage of the pipeline.  Legba has no impact on the EX 
stage. 
Secondly, in the case of sidecar hits, the PKC has no impact 
on either the WB stage or the ID stage.  With sidecar hits, the 
maximum path length of the PKC is a comparator (not equal, 
of the same width as the OID), 4 AND gates, 2 OR gates, an 
inverter and a latch.  We find it improbable that any critical 
path could fail to exceed this. 
Thirdly, in the case where the critical path is established by 
the MA stage, our critical path is lengthened by a single AND3 
gate.  
Finally, for the case where the critical path is established by 
the IF stage, the critical path is lengthened by only an inverter, 
a comparator (equals, of instruction width), and an AND gate. 
In all cases, we think it is clear that Legba does not 
significantly impact the processor critical path.  Any timing 
impact from Legba will come from cache misses and pipeline 
stalls. 
2) Frequency of Stalls 
Legba contributes to more frequent pipeline stalls in several 
ways. 
First, by adding an OID to the cache lines, Legba reduces 
the available size of the cache line.  Likewise, the PKC takes 
valuable real-estate on the processor core and reduces the 
available space for cache.  Reduced cache size will always lead 
to some level of increased miss rate.  However, this miss rate 
cannot be determined from design, but requires experimental 
evaluation. 
Simply by adding two caches for protection information, 
Legba adds an additional source for cache misses and pipeline 
stalls.  While we expect PKC misses to be rare compared to 
data cache misses, this cannot avoid increasing cache miss 
frequency.  Indeed, since we now have 4 caches competing for 
access to L2, we can have increased stall times from L2 cache 
contention. 
3) Additional Memory Accesses 
Aside from increased miss frequency, a cache miss in 
Legba is potentially more expensive. 
On a cache miss from the PKC, we need to index into a 
two-level hash table.  Since this is potentially as much as two 
DRAM lookups, the stall time is greatly increased, particularly 
in view of the fact that other processors do not even have a 
PKC. 
In most cases, we think it is probable that L2 will contain 
the bulk of the top-level portion of the PKT, so we expect most 
PKC misses to require an L2 lookup followed by a DRAM 
lookup.  We do not expect the protection information from the 
PDHT to ever be found in L2, since the only time it is loaded is 
when loading the L1 PKC.  Thus, unless we flush from the 
PKC but not from L2, this information will always be found in 
the PKC, or loaded from DRAM. 
Fortunately, we expect PKC misses to be rare.  We expect 
that there will be a limited number of active objects at any 
time.  Since the PKC cache line is approximately 20 bits long, 
we can expect to hold a large number of object protection lines 
without substantial cost.  Since we would expect normal use to 
include a small number of tightly clustered object, it should be 
rare to see many new objects accessed (from different 
protection domains) in rapid succession.  Finally, the addition 
of sidecars removes the PKC from the critical path.  In some 
cases, it is even possible for the sidecar to hit when the PKC 
would miss.  
B. Unexpected Data Dependency 
The original Legba design in [2] contains a flaw.  When 
attempting to write to L1 data cache, we must first lookup the 
associated OID and send it to the PKC for permissions 
checking.  However, the PKC is in the next pipeline stage! 
This problem is inherent in the Legba architectural model.  
For read operations, this is unimportant.  We can read the data, 
discover that read access is unavailable, and generate an 
exception.  The data is thrown away on exception, so there is 
no protection impact.  For writes, we cannot complete the write 
until we have validated write permission. 
We earlier alluded to a data dependency problem in the data 
cache and PKC design.  In our discussion of their 
implementation, this point was omitted for clarity. 
We developed a workaround for this problem by adding an 
instruction lookahead from the EX stage to the MA stage.  
When the MA stage receives a write operation, it uses a 2-state 
FSM to hold the write until the PKC in the next stage has 
signaled wr_ok.  If the next instruction is a memory access, 
we stall the pipeline until the write permissions are resolved. 
One optimization that appears to be available is to perform 
the write immediately if we discover that the sidecar 
information is valid and allows writing.  Since the sidecar 
information is validated by comparing the sidecar OID with the 
cache OID, it seems we can avoid the pipeline stall by checking 
this in the MA stage. 
This is not the case.  Our data cache must first read the data 
to obtain the OID.  Only after this read can we test the sidecar 
validity.  Unless the processor critical path is more than double 
the time of a data cache access, we cannot both read the OID 
and write the data all in a single pipeline stage without 
noticeably lengthening the critical path. 
We consider this problem to have very limited impact on 
performance.  Modern compiler technology is well able to 
handle re-ordering instructions to avoid known processor 
hazards.  In this case, the only hazard is on a memory write 
followed immediately by a memory access.  Unavoidable cases 
should be vanishingly rare.  In those few cases that do apply, 
the penalty is only a single cycle stall. 
C. Protection Key Table 
The PKT as implemented has a limited multi-trie system for 
handling collisions.  While our reasoning is that, due to the 
order of OID allocations, collisions in the PKT will be limited; 
we must consider the possibility that our expected usage 
patterns are incorrect. 
Large numbers of collisions would require extending the 
trie system.  However, extending the trie system arbitrarily has 
the potential to make PKC miss time unbounded.  Further, an 
operating system error has the potential to produce a circular 
trie list, locking the processor in a hardware memory walker 
loop.  We consider this an unacceptable compromise. 
Additional experimental data is necessary before the PKT 
collision rate can be properly established.  Significant 
additional hardware design would be required to manage 
extension of the existing trie system. 
D. Object Look-aside Buffer 
The OLB is effectively a form of very non-standard content 
addressable memory.  In our implementation, we only have 16-
bit OIDs; nonetheless, this requires 8 bytes per OID for base 
and limit, for a total OLB size of 512KB. 
Since the OLB is fully associative, searched in parallel on 
every lookup, this requires two comparators for each line, 
along with a large aggregation network.  We consider the cost 
of this OLB to be excessive. 
The OLB is not a standard CAM, and CAM prices do not 
apply because of the two-comparator test.  However, if we 
judge from existing CAM architectures, a megabyte of CAM is 
currently around $10.  If we assume that doubling the number 
of comparators roughly doubles the cost, a rough ball-park 
figure for this component is $20.  With any additional cooling 
capacity, a realistic total cost could be $30-$50. [12] 
While this sounds like a minimal cost, the consumer market 
has shown a trend toward considering cost above performance 
(and functionality) when purchasing memory.  We consider it 
unlikely that consumers would be interested in this additional 
expense without significant demonstrable gain. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
A. Experimental evaluation of PKT collisions 
Our analysis, like that of the original Legba designers, 
suggests that collisions in the PKT should be rare.  We believe 
that some experimental analysis should be performed to 
determine the real extent of collisions. 
This requires developing a model of a hypothetical 
operating system using Legba as a basis for protection 
mechanisms.  In the original Legba paper, the authors used 
user-level code and assigned each variable a different OID.  
We consider the impact of the operating system to be non-
negligible, and we believe that objects must be more sanely 
delineated. 
For example, we could develop a system where a memory 
allocator controlled its own memory.  Allocation requests enter 
through a call gate; some amount of memory is selected for 
allocation.  That memory unit’s PKT contents are reassigned to 
provide read/write access to the requesting thread. 
Developing a design of an entire operating system around 
the concepts of fine-grained intra-address space protection is a 
non-trivial task, and a project we consider well worthwhile 
under its own merits. 
B. Per-user Object Look-aside Buffer 
One way to fix the problem of a large, fully associative 
OLB is to have smaller, per-process (or per-user) OLBs.  We 
believe that this can substantially alleviate the problem by 
reducing the OLB size. 
To maintain separation among different processes, this 
requires flushing the OLB and reloading for each context 
switch.  This is already necessary for virtual memory 
implementations, where the TLB is flushed and reloaded for 
each context switch.  We anticipate that the OLB flush 
overhead can be shielded by the TLB flush overhead. 
C. Removing Object Look-aside Buffer 
Legba’s objects are really no different from ordinary 
segments.  They have a base and a limit, and a set of 
permissions associated with them.  The major distinction is 
that, when accessing segments, the user (via the compiler) must 
be aware of the segment being accessed. 
We believe it is possible to remove the OLB completely by 
making objects completely into segments.  If the program must 
supply an OID (or segment ID!) on every memory access, this 
completely removes the OLB from the design.  It also changes 
the semantics of the mapping by allowing objects to overlap.  
As Legba stands, they may not, since the OLB must be 
guaranteed to return a single OID for any address. 
This is still different from segmentation as applied to 
modern processors such as the Intel architecture.  Segments 
normally have a set of limited hierarchical privilege levels.  We 
would change this by supporting constructs allowing a 
completely arbitrary set of access control lists. 
This is a significant redesign of the original Legba scheme.  
We do not believe it is appropriate to simply graft this change 
onto Legba.  On the contrary, we think a change of this nature 
should necessitate a complete redesign of Legba, because 
additional optimizations – or problems – may present 
themselves. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Having implemented Legba, even on a limied architecture 
such as the MiniMIPS, we believe that this architecture 
represents a promising direction for research.  With some of the 
limitations we have seen, we do not believe legba is ready for 
production use in a real microprocessor.  However, continuing 
research is strongly indicated. 
In particular, we recommend that two directions toward 
future work be explored: 
First, there is a need to explore operating system design in 
an arena where fine-grained protection exists. 
Second, there should be a redesign of Legba where 
programs must present OIDs for object access. 
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